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Abstract
Morgan, Brent. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2014. The Impact of
Mood on Multitasking Performance and Adaptation. Major Professor: Arthur C.
Graesser, Ph.D.

We all have emotional experiences throughout our day, and multitasking has
become similarly commonplace. It is surprising, then, that the effect of mood on
multitasking performance and adaptation is not yet understood. In an initial study
(Experiment 1; Morgan & D’Mello, in preparation), people in a negative mood had
significantly worse multitasking performance than those in positive or neutral moods.
However, the impact of mood on adaptation when multitasking is an open question
because performance and adaptation may be different constructs. A second experiment
examined the relationship between mood and multitasking adaptation under increasing
task difficulty. One prediction would be a replication of the results from Experiment 1,
with no interaction for positive or negative moods between multitasking phases. In
contrast, a number of theories, including the Affect Infusion Model, would predict that
differences among moods would not be consistent in the face of increasing task difficulty.
The results indicated a replication of Experiment 1, where the negative group was
consistently worse at adapting than positive and neutral. However, the individual tasks
with mood differences in Experiment 2 (Audio and Visual Monitoring) were not the same
as the tasks with mood differences for Experiment 1 (Memory, Math), and required
different cognitive abilities. This supports the argument that multitasking performance
and adaptation may be separate constructs.
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The Impact of Mood on Multitasking Performance and Adaptation
Multitasking has become a common practice in today’s world. In fact, some
people even prefer to multitask rather than complete one task at a time (Branscome,
Swoboda, & Fatkin, 2007; Poposki, Oswald, & Brou, 2009; Slocombe & Bluedorn,
1999). Multitasking not only requires performing multiple tasks, but also switching from
one task to another over short time spans (Oswald, Hambrick, & Jones, 2007).
Multitasking is expected in many occupations (González, & Mark, 2004), and is
increasingly expected in the classroom (Watson, Terry, & Doolittle, 2012).
Although task switching may be voluntary in many of these cases, there certainly
are many occupations in which a person may have no control over when they must switch
tasks. For example, the chef does not get to decide when the steak is done (Salvucci &
Taatgen, 2008), nor can the air traffic controller pause a flight in midair (Wickens, 1991).
Information workers are frequently interrupted by co-workers throughout the day
(Czerwinski, Horvitz, & Wilhite, 2004). Thus, the focus is on multitasking environments
with some element of involuntary task scheduling.
Performing multiple tasks simultaneously is more challenging than doing a single
task (Monsell, 2003; Sauer, Wastell, & Hockey, 1999). This is due to a ‘switch cost’
which occurs during rapid task switching (Monsell, 2003). The switch cost is expressed
as either additional time to complete the task, an increase in errors in task execution, or
both. When multitasking, people can become overloaded as working memory and
attentional resources are exhausted. They might become anxious and frustrated when task
challenges outweigh cognitive resources (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Furthermore, overall
performance can be adversely affected when the demands of one task interfere with those
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of another (Altmann & Gray, 2008). Thus, with multitasking, the whole does not always
equal the sum of the individual parts.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to multitasking because performance varies
across individuals (Watson & Strayer, 2010). There have been some attempts to identify
the individual differences associated with multitasking performance. For example,
differences in perceptual speed (Oberlander, Oswald, Hambrick, & Jones, 2007), age,
(Branscome et al., 2007) and neuroticism (Oswald, Hambrick, & Jones, 2007; Poposki,
Oswald, & Chen, 2008) have been linked to multitasking effectiveness. There are
differences in polychronicity (preference for multitasking), as mentioned previously.
Perhaps surprisingly, frequent multitaskers are actually worse at multitasking (Lin, 2009;
Ophir, Nass, & Wagner, 2009). Another component of multitasking is prospective
memory (Dismukes & Nowinski, 2006; Shallice & Burgess, 1991), or remembering to
perform some action in the future. While a person is attending to one task, he must also
remember to address the other task(s) or potentially risk task failure. However, the
critical predictor of performance appears to be working memory and executive control,
ostensibly because multitasking requires the individual to maintain representations of
different tasks in working memory and strategically deploy attentional resources to
effectively switch between these tasks (Bühner, König, Pick, & Krumm, 2006; Hambrick,
Oswald, Darowski, Rench, & Brou, 2010; Oberlander et al, 2007; Rubinstein, Meyer, &
Evans, 2001).
Various individual differences measures have been associated with multitasking
performance under the assumption that there are stable cognitive traits. It is reasonable to
assume, however, that more transitory measures also impact multitasking, such as
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emotions and cognitive-affective states. The Affective Events Theory (Weiss &
Cropanzano, 1996) argues that everyday events in the workplace elicit emotional
responses that may be of short (a few seconds) or intermediate (a few minutes) duration.
These responses, in turn, influence task performance.
Our emotions would presumably interact with cognitive functioning under the
assumption that they are separate entities that only periodically interact (Storbeck &
Clore, 2007, Zajonc, 1980, 2000). However, researchers have come to appreciate the role
that affect plays across numerous aspects of cognition and task performance, including
working memory (Baddeley, 2013), motivation (Solomon & Corbit, 1974), and complex
learning (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). Cognition and affect are inextricably bound in
most contemporary theories.
Researchers have specifically investigated differences between positive and
negative affect, with the former considered to be superior in many cognitive frameworks.
Positive affect is linked to numerous aspects of success, including a person’s occupation,
social relationships, and health (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Negative affect, in
contrast, has been shown to impede performance on numerous cognitive tasks, including
executive functioning and memory (Marvel & Paradiso, 2004). That being said, the
liabilities of negative affect are hardly universal. Negative affect has been shown to be
advantageous under particular conditions, such as performance appraisal (Sinclair, 1988),
persuasion (Forgas, 2007), and complex problem solving (Barth & Funke, 2007; Fiedler,
1988). Chepenik, Cornew, and Farah (2007) also argue that the impact of negative mood
on cognition is not near as pervasive as the literature suggests.
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Mood has also been linked to another critical factor in task performance, namely
attention. The broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) posits that
positive affect (i.e., happiness) begets a wider range of attention and thought-action
repertoires than one might normally consider. Similar studies have shown that positive
affect tends to promote global processing of visual information, whereas negative affect
facilitates more local processing (Gasper & Clore, 2002). To simplify, people in a
positive state tend to see the forest while people in a negative state focus on the trees.
Although there is evidence for several benefits of positive affect over negative
affect (Fredrickson, 2003; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005), the
gains that result from a positive mental state do come at a cost. For example, positive
moods are associated with greater distractibility. These distractions can affect low-level
perceptual tasks (e.g., flanker task; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007) because positive
affect is associated with a wider field of vision (Schmitz, De Rosa, & Anderson, 2009).
However, this increased in visual attention may only occur for positively valenced stimuli
(Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006). Additionally, recent findings suggest that positive affect
facilitates whichever focus is currently dominant (Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010).
That is, people in positive moods have either a global or a local focus, depending on
which of the two is primed. However, if neither is primed, people in a positive mood
would presumably adopt the global focus by default.
In addition to perceptual distractions, positive mood can impact higher level tasks,
such as set-switching and cognitive flexibility (Dreisbach, 2006; Dreisbach & Goschke,
2004; Dreisbach et al., 2005). In the present context, positive affect has a deleterious
impact on performance when executing a to-be-maintained goal. Thus, although people
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in a positive mood are more flexible and open to environmental changes, this comes at a
cost of increased distractibility (and reduced performance) when the task constraints
remain constant.
Whereas positive mood increases distractibility, negative mood allows for a
deeper focus on the task at hand (Andrews & Thomson, 2009). This is especially true for
complex tasks, which can be decomposed into smaller, more manageable components
where each component is addressed in turn (Andrews & Thomson, 2009; Barth & Funke,
2007). People in a negative mood can solve the overall complex problem because they
can focus on the individual components without getting distracted by the other
components. In fact, negative affect (especially when combined with high arousal)
narrows the scope of perceptual attention (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Easterbrook,
1959) while increasing selective attention (Finucane, 2011).
Positive and negative moods, therefore, appear to have somewhat opposite effects
on task performance. Although these findings are well-supported across a number of
individual tasks, researchers have primarily focused on single-task performance.
However, an open question is how positive vs. negative mood affect multitasking. This
dissertation investigates this topic with three separate experiments. The first section
presents a completed study on how mood affects multitasking performance (Experiment
1). The second section presents two proposed experiments that investigate the impact
manipulated moods have on how a person copes with changing task constraints while
multitasking (Experiment 2) and whether mood has any impact on each individual task of
a multitasking environment when performed separately (Experiment 3).
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Experiment 1
This section reports an empirical study that investigates how mood affects
multitasking, as opposed to single-task performance. As stated previously, one of the
many challenges of multitasking is to remember to switch tasks at appropriate times (a
form of prospective memory). Kliegel et al. (2005) reported that people in a negative
mood showed a decrease in timeliness of prospective memory responses (i.e., task
monitoring) compared to those in a neutral mood. One possible explanation for the
reduction in timeliness is that people in a negative mood are deeply focused on the
current task (Andrews & Thompson, 2009) and lose track of time. Thus, people in a
negative mood may be worse in multitasking environments in which at least one task has
a time-sensitive monitoring component.
Multitasking also requires the efficient allocation of attention in order to
effectively switch between tasks. Thus, if positive and negative moods have opposite
effects on attention, these differences would be clearly evident in multitasking
performance. This raises a central question to be explored in this dissertation: does a
more global scope in visual attention and task completion for positive (vs. negative)
moods help or hinder multitasking? A pilot study provides some initial empirical findings
that are relevant to this question. An experiment was conducted in which participants
multitasked at a baseline, watched a video designed to induce either a positive, neutral, or
negative mood, and then resumed multitasking for two additional phases, as elaborated
below.
The multitasking environment (SYNWORK, see Figure 1) consisted of a memory
task, visual and auditory monitoring tasks, and a math task. The math task required
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numerous mouse clicks to solve each problem, as well as more complex cognitive
operations. Hence, distractible people would be expected to have more interruptions
while solving each math problem. In the visual monitoring task, a button had to be
clicked before a specified amount of time to avoid task failure. This assessed the ability
to remember to perform a task in the future (i.e., prospective memory). Both
distractibility and prospective memory are related to the global vs. local paradigm. The
memory task consisted of six letters that had to be remembered when probed. The
auditory monitoring task had a target (high) pitch and a distractor (low) pitch. Table 1
compares the four tasks on the relevant psychological characteristics.
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Figure 1. The SYNWORK Multitasking Environment

Table 1
Psychological Characteristics of Each Task
Task
Visual
Auditory
Monitoring
Monitoring

Characteristics

Memory

Complexity

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Distractibility

No

No

No

Yes

Prospective
Memory

Yes

Yes

No

No

8

Math

Additionally, differences in multitasking scores could be due to motivation rather
than proficiency. For example, people in a negative mood may be less active when
multitasking while their performance may be no less accurate, proportionally. This could
be assessed by comparing the number of mouse clicks and transitions between tasks (i.e.,
a click in one zone followed by a click in a different zone).
Experimental (i.e., post-video) multitasking was broken into two separate phases,
Multitasking 1 (MT 1) and Multitasking 2 (MT2), with identical difficulty and lasting
three minutes each. The phases were split for three reasons. First, a person’s mood can
fade, especially when focused on a task (Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). A break
between experimental multitasking phases allowed us to assess whether multitasking had
any impact on the participants’ mood. Second, even if mood persists, its impact may
diminish over time (Kliegel et al., 2005). Two experimental phases allowed us to
compare the immediate versus delayed impact of mood on multitasking. Third,
multitasking is stressful and exhausting, so a break allowed participants to briefly relax
and recharge.
In regards to the impact of positive vs. negative mood on multitasking, there are
two competing hypotheses, based on differences in global vs. local processing outlined
by the levels of focus hypothesis (Clore et al., 2001; Gasper, 2004; Gasper & Clore,
2002). The first argues that an expansion of attention (positive mood) would improve
multitasking performance because it would improve a person’s ability to monitor each
individual task. The second hypothesis is that additional task monitoring would be
distracting and increase task switch costs, whereas negative mood would facilitate
completion of individual tasks without interruption. That is, negative mood may be
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superior because the person would be more likely to focus on one problem at a time
(Andrews & Thomson, 2009), thus avoiding the inherent performance costs associated
with multitasking. On the opposite end of the spectrum, they may become too focused,
and impaired prospective memory may result in task failure. As these predictions are laid
out, it is important to note that negative mood is not a simple mirror of positive mood
even though the predictions for positive and negative moods are opposite in this paper
(Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Dreisbach, 2006).
A neutral condition was also included, which could determine whether a
difference between the positive and negative conditions was due to: a benefit to one
mood (mood 1 > neutral = mood 2), a penalty to one mood (mood 1 = neutral > mood 2),
or both (mood 1 > neutral > mood 2). Thus, the performance of the neutral condition
should aid in explaining any differences between the positive and negative conditions.
Considering that attending to global features (Navon, 1977) and information (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991) is the default processing strategy, the neutral condition would be expected
to align more closely with the positive group.
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Method
Participants
The sample was composed of 178 participants recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT was specifically chosen for this experiment, having used
college students in previous multitasking papers (Morgan et al., 2013a, 2013b). Recent
research suggests that AMT is a reliable and valid source to collect experimental data and
has confirmed that AMT samples are considerably more diverse than the typical
undergraduate student population in the U.S. (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011;
Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Rand, 2012). Participants
were over 18, from the USA, and paid $1.25 for their participation.
SYNWORK. (Elsmore, 1994; see Figure 1) is a computer-based multitasking
environment composed of synthetic work tasks that are relevant to a number of jobs (e.g.,
naval ship operation). SYNWORK requires users to simultaneously attend to four
individual tasks: Memory, Visual Monitoring, Auditory Monitoring, and Math.
Environments such as SYNWORK are ideal for data collection because of their
experimental control and realism (DiFonzo, Hantula, & Bordia, 1998). The SYNWORK
interface is shown in Figure 1. The task was implemented as specified by Elsmore
(1994), but with some modifications as noted below. It was programmed in Action Script
3 and can run on any browser that supported Adobe Flash.
Memory. In the top-left quadrant of the screen, participants were asked to
remember a target list of six letters which were presented at the beginning of each
multitasking phase. The list was randomly chosen from a subset of the alphabet (minus C,
D, M, Q, and V, which are often difficult to distinguish). After 5 s, the target list was then
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removed, and a series of single-letter probes were displayed. Participants had to
determine whether the probe letter was included in the target list. Participants could see
the target list again by clicking “Retrieve List” at the cost of 10 points. Correct responses
increased the participant’s score by 10 points; incorrect responses or timeouts (10 s)
decreased the score by 10 points. If the participant did not answer after 10 s, 10 points
were automatically deducted. After points were awarded/deducted, a new probe letter
appeared. The target list was refreshed at the start of each condition.
Visual Monitoring. In the bottom-left quadrant, a one-dimensional horizontal bar
was displayed with a triangular pointer which started at the center of the scale. The
pointer always moved away from the center of the bar (either left or right) at the rate of 1
unit per second. The participants earned points by clicking a “Reset” button below the
scale before the pointer reached the end of the bar. Participants received more points the
closer the pointer was to the edge of the bar when the “Reset” button was clicked, up to a
maximum of 10. If the pointer reached the end of the bar however, 10 points were
deducted at the same rate as the pointer’s movement (i.e., 10 per s) until the “Reset”
button was clicked.
Auditory Monitoring. In the bottom-right quadrant, participants were asked to
respond to one of two auditory stimuli. Participants were first trained on discriminating
low vs. high pitches. If they heard a high-pitched sound (40% of probes), they were to
click the “High Sound Report” button, whereas they were to ignore a lower-pitched
sound. Participants received 10 points for a correct high sound report, and lost 10 points
for an incorrect report or a timeout (10 s).
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Math. In the top-right quadrant, participants were asked to solve a two-digit
arithmetic problem using the “+” and “—” boxes corresponding to each digit. They had
30s to solve each problem and clicked the “Done” button to submit their answer. Correct
solutions increased their score by 10; incorrect solutions resulted in a loss of 10 points;
and failure to respond within 30 s resulted in a loss of points at the rate of 10 points per
second.
Mood Induction
Participants watched videos designed to put them in a positive, neutral, or
negative mood. The positive video (“Whose Line is it Anyway?”; 2m28s) featured an
improv comedy routine. The neutral video (“Blue”; 2m05s) consisted of several dialoguefree scenes from a drama film. The negative video (“The Champ”; 2m45s) depicted a
child witnessing the death of his father. These clips were selected because they have been
extensively normed and used in several studies (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot,
2010).
Affect Grid. Participants’ dimensional affect (valence and arousal) was measured
using the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989). The Affect Grid is a singleitem affect measurement instrument consisting of a 9 × 9 (valence × arousal) grid, and is
a validated measure of affect with adequate reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .85),
convergent validity (correlations of .90 or higher with similar scales of affect), and
discriminant validity (correlations of .20 or less with dissimilar scales of affect). The
arousal dimension ranges from low arousal (1) to high arousal (9), while the valence
dimension ranges from unpleasant feelings (1) to pleasant feelings (9). The Affect Grid
was presented on the computer screen and participants responded by using the mouse to
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select the box anywhere on the grid that best represented their current affective state (see
Figure 2). The benefit of using the Affect Grid is that participants can report their
affective state without the presence of affect labels, which can sometimes be confusing or
interpreted differently across individuals.

Figure 2. The Affect Grid
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Procedure
Participants were first trained on how to use the Affect Grid, followed by training
on individual SYNWORK tasks (45 s each, except for math which was 60 s). Participants
then practiced all four SYNWORK tasks simultaneously (multitasked) for 1 min. After
practicing all four tasks together, participants multitasked for 3 min (Multitasking
Baseline; MT BL). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three video
conditions: positive, neutral, or negative. Each participant saw only one video in the
experiment. Following the video, participants self-reported their affective states with the
Affect Grid (manipulation check). Participants then resumed multitasking for two
experimental phases, Multitasking 1 (MT 1) and Multitasking 2 (MT 2; 3 min each). The
difficulty for both MT 1 and MT 2 was identical to the difficulty in the baseline phase.
After each multitasking phase, participants again self-reported their affect with the Affect
Grid.
Results
We began by assessing the efficacy of the mood induction because a nontrivial
percentage of people fail to respond to mood induction procedures (Martin, 1990). We
removed 39 participants who did not report an affect valence of 7-9 in the positive video
condition, 4-6 in the neutral video condition, or 1-3 in the negative video condition.
These stringent removal criteria were used to give confidence that each participant was in
the mood intended to be elicited by the video.
In addition to mood congruence, multitasking competency was also assessed.
After calculating SYNWORK scores, nine participants who were not able to adequately
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perform the task were removed. Multitasking performance with z-scores ± 3 were
recoded to 3 standard deviations for the remaining 130 participants.
Mood Induction
Our first analysis was to assess the efficacy of the mood elicitation. Participants
rated their mood three times: after watching the video (Post-Video), after the first
experimental multitasking phase (Post-MT 1), and after the second experimental
multitasking phase (Post-MT 2). The mood induction was assessed with two 3 × 3 (video
condition × affect grid phase) mixed ANOVAs, with valence and arousal ratings as the
dependent variables.
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for video condition and affect
scores. For valence, an ANOVA showed a main effect for affect grid phase, F(2, 254) =
5.54, p = .004, ηp2 = .042, MSE = 1.78. Planned comparisons revealed the following
pattern in the data: (Post-MT 1 = Post-MT 2) > Post-Video. There was a main effect for
video condition, F(2, 127) = 63.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .499, MSE = 4.48, with planned
comparisons confirming positive > neutral > negative. There was also a significant
interaction, F(4, 254) = 49.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .440, MSE = 1.78. For Post-Video ratings,
planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data: positive > neutral >
negative. The wide differences in valence scores after watching the video confirms the
impact of the mood induction. For both Post-MT 1 and Post-MT 2 ratings, planned
comparisons revealed identical patterns: (neutral = positive) > negative, indicating that
the reduction in valence for the negative condition persisted throughout the experiment.
After assessing valence, an identical analysis was conducted on arousal. There
was no main effect for affect grid phase, F(2, 254) = 50.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .284, MSE =
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1.51. There was a marginally significant effect for video condition F(2, 127) = 2.91, p =
.056, ηp2 = .044, , MSE = 4.67, showing the following trend: positive > (negative =
neutral). There was also a significant interaction, F(4, 254) = 4.40, p = .002, ηp2 = .065,
MSE = 1.51. Planned comparisons revealed a pattern (positive > neutral = negative), but
only for the Post-Video phase. Essentially, people in the positive video condition reported
higher arousal immediately after the video, but otherwise there were no differences.

Table 2
Valence and Arousal Means (SD) by Condition and Phase
Affect Grid Phase
Valence
Video
Condition

Positive
Neutral
Negative
Average

Arousal
Positive
Neutral
Negative
Average
MT = Multitasking
Video
Condition

Post-Video
8.03 (0.77)
5.09 (0.72)
1.77 (0.77)
4.87 (0.76)

Post-MT 1
5.95 (1.71)
5.87 (1.64)
4.52 (2.15)
5.44 (1.83)

Post-MT 2
5.70 (2.00)
5.96 (1.67)
4.64 (2.32)
5.43 (2.00)

Average
6.56 (1.49)
5.64 (1.35)
3.64 (1.75)

Post-Video
6.80 (1.40)
5.41 (1.77)
5.48 (1.97)
5.86 (1.71)

Post-MT 1
7.38 (1.51)
7.13 (1.20)
7.34 (1.45)
7.28 (1.39)

Post-MT 2
7.28 (1.62)
7.04 (1.35)
7.14 (1.95)
7.15 (1.64)

Average
7.15 (1.51)
6.53 (1.44)
6.65 (1.79)

Multitasking Performance
The analysis started with an assessment of the three video conditions, which were
equivalent in multitasking scores at baseline. A one-way ANOVA with overall
SYNWORK scores (i.e., the sum of the four individual task scores) as the dependent
variable showed no differences between the video groups at baseline (p = 0.853; see
17

Table 3 for descriptives; additionally all kurtosis statistics for each multitasking variable
is included in the appendix). Next, the impact of mood on multitasking performance was
assessed with a 3 × 2 (video condition × multitasking phase) mixed ANCOVA, with
overall SYNWORK scores as the dependent variable. The between-subjects independent
variable was video condition (positive, neutral, negative), whereas the within-subjects
independent variable was multitasking phase (MT 1, MT 2). Baseline Multitasking scores
were included as a covariate to control for performance prior to watching the mood
elicitation videos. The results revealed a significant main effect for video condition, F(2,
126) = 4.52, p = .013, ηp2 = .067, MSE = 18,300. Planned comparisons revealed the
following pattern in the data: positive = neutral > negative. These data are plotted in
Figure 3. Given the difference in post-video arousal scores, a separate model was tested
which included post-video arousal score as a covariate; however, it was not a statistically
significant covariate (p = .718), and it had no impact on either main effect or on the
interaction. Hence, it was removed from the final model.
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Table 3
Multitasking Means (SD) by Condition and Phase
Condition N
Positive
40
Neutral
46
Negative 44

MT BL
269 (136)
252 (198)
271 (168)

Multitasking Phase
MT 1
MT 2
329 (151)
394 (100)
329 (139)
336 (156)
270 (195)
333 (164)

Memory

Positive
Neutral
Negative

40
46
44

67.8 (85.3)
61.3 (100)
65.7 (87.6)

84.3 (91.1)
97.0 (74.4)
68.9 (92.7)

126 (44.8)
97.2 (77.9)
90.2 (78.1)

105 (67.9)
97.1 (76.1)
79.5 (85.4)

Visual

Positive
Neutral
Negative

40
46
44

72.6 (27.6)
58.6 (57.8)
71.0 (32.5)

69.4 (31.8)
69.2 (30.2)
70.9 (41.6)

75.5 (23.6)
67.0 (33.2)
65.5 (39.5)

72.5 (27.7)
68.1 (31.7)
68.2 (40.6)

Audio

Positive
Neutral
Negative

40
46
44

44.8 (32.4)
39.3 (28.2)
47.8 (36.7)

48.8 (32.9)
48.0 (27.5)
42.3 (41.3)

55.0 (23.0)
47.0 (28.6)
48.4 (34.7)

51.9 (28.0)
47.5 (28.0)
45.3 (38.0)

Positive
40 88.2 (86.9) 126.5 (61.1)
Neutral
46 95.5 (73.6) 113.7 (66.1)
Negative 44 86.6 (84.7) 86.4 (101.6)
BL = Baseline; MT = Multitasking; Avg. = Average

137 (57.7)
123 (75.9)
128 (68.5)

131 (59.4)
118 (71.0)
107 (85.1)

Task
Overall

Math
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MT 1&2 Avg.
361 (126)
332 (147)
301 (180)

Figure 3. Experiment 1 Multitasking Scores by Video Conditions (BL as Covariate)

There was also a marginally significant interaction between multitasking phase
and video condition, F(2, 126) = 2.36, p = .098, ηp2 = .036, MSE = 10,700. Planned
comparisons for video conditions at MT 1 revealed a pattern that was identical to the
overall main effect: (positive = neutral) > negative. For MT 2, however, the planned
comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data: positive > (neutral = negative).
Additionally, the statistically significant differences were associated with a medium to
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large effect size. The results of the planned comparisons with effect sizes are presented in
Table 4.

Table 4
Planned Comparison Results with Cohen’s d
MT phase
MT 1

MT 2

Mood
Positive
Neutral
Negative

Mood 1
Positive
Positive
Neutral
Positive
Positive
Neutral
MT 1
MT 1
MT 1
MT 1

Notes. * p < .05 ** p < .01

=
>
>

Mood 2
Neutral
Negative
Negative

|d|
0.00
0.34*
0.35*

>
>
=

Neutral
Negative
Negative

0.44*
0.45*
0.02

<
=
<

MT 2
MT 2
MT 2
MT 2

|d|
0.50**
0.04
0.35**

MT = Multitasking

Planned comparisons for multitasking phases revealed the following pattern in the
data: MT 2 > MT 1 for both positive and negative video conditions, but MT 2 = MT 1 for
the neutral video condition. Again, the statistically significant differences were associated
with a medium to large effect size (Table 4). Thus, both sets of planned comparisons
reflect the lack of improvement for the neutral video condition from MT 1 to MT 2, but
the two affect conditions did show differences.
After comparing overall multitasking scores, the next question was whether these
contrasts were caused by large differences in one or more individual tasks, or a
combination of smaller differences across all four tasks. Accordingly, the four individual
SYNWORK tasks were analyzed using separate mixed ANCOVAs, with the respective
Baseline score as a covariate to control for performance prior to watching the mood
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elicitation videos (these and remaining analyses use the identical format as the previous
analysis on overall scores). There were no differences between video conditions for the
Visual Monitoring (F(2, 126) = 0.563, p = .571, ηp2 = .009, MSE = 1,090) or Auditory
Monitoring (F(2, 126) = 1.09, p = .341, ηp2 = .017, MSE = 1,040) tasks. There were
marginally significant findings for the Memory (F(2, 126) = 2.79, p = .065, ηp2 = .042,
MSE = 5,270) and Math (F(2, 126) = 2.55, p = .082, ηp2 = .039, MSE = 4,760) tasks.
Planned comparisons for both tasks revealed identical patterns: positive > negative (see
Table 3 for descriptive statistics), with neutral not significantly different from either.
Math and memory predicted overall scores (regression), lending credence to the notion
that these two tasks were driving the overall differences. However, the positive condition
did have the highest raw mean score in all 4 individual tasks as well. Thus, it appears as
though the difference in overall scores was a product of all four individual tasks, but with
some extra emphasis on memory and math.
Another hypothesis was that the positive condition may suffer performance hits
due to increased distractibility. Distractions were coded as a function of interruptions in
the math task because multiple clicks were required to solve each math problem.
Specifically, a distraction occurred whenever a participant clicked any ‘+’ or ‘—‘ sign,
then clicked in another task without finishing the problem (i.e., clicking ‘done’). Multiple
distractions on a single problem were possible. Distractibility, then, was calculated as the
ratio of distractions per math problem solved (either correctly or incorrectly).
Distractibility was assessed using a mixed ANCOVA, with distractibility scores
as the dependent variable. The results were marginally significant, F(2, 126) = 2.57, p =
.080, ηp2 = .039, MSE = 0.077. Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the
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data: negative > positive. The descriptive statistics for distractibility are presented in
Table 5. The neutral condition was not significantly different from either positive or
negative. So if anything, the positive group was actually less distractible than the
negative group.
Table 5
Distractibility Means (SD) by Condition and Phase
Multitasking Phase
Condition N
MT BL
MT 1
MT 2
Positive
40 0.40 (0.26) 0.32 (0.23) 0.33 (0.25)
Neutral
46 0.36 (0.21) 0.41 (0.26) 0.34 (0.23)
Negative 44 0.47 (0.31) 0.50 (0.34) 0.40 (0.28)
BL = Baseline; MT = Multitasking; Avg. = Average

MT 1&2 Avg.
0.33 (0.24)
0.38 (0.25)
0.45 (0.31)

Lastly, there is the question whether mood affected quantity rather than quality of
performance. For example, it is possible that participants’ mood affected their motivation,
manifested as the total number of clicks or transitions. However, there was no difference
in the number of clicks among the video conditions, F(2, 126) = 1.04, p = .355, ηp2 =
.016, MSE = 1,880. Similarly, there were no differences in the number of overall
transitions from one task to another, F(2, 126) = 0.932, p = .396, ηp2 = .015, MSE = 55.4.
Thus, it does not appear as though the negative condition clicked less; rather, they clicked
less accurately.
Discussion
The impact of mood on multitasking performance was assessed by having
participants multitask before and after watching a positive, neutral, or negative video.
The mood induction methods were effective, eliciting the desired valence in over three
quarters of participants. The positive condition reported a somewhat higher level of
arousal, but only directly after watching the video, than did the neutral and negative
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conditions. Whereas neutral videos can be expected to elicit a lower level of arousal than
emotion-laden ones (Schaefer et al., 2010), the reduced arousal for the negative condition
was unusual. Regardless, adjusting for Post-Video arousal scores did not affect the
findings. Furthermore, both the neutral and negative groups had identical arousal rates
directly after watching the video, but only the negative condition indicated an immediate
reduction in multitasking performance.
The group differences in both arousal and valence immediately following the
video were largely gone after the first experimental multitasking session (MT 1; Table 2).
However, a notable exception was a persistent lower valence for the negative condition
after both experimental multitasking phases. This supports the claim that a high working
memory load is not sufficient to disrupt a person from a negative mood (Van Dillen &
Koole, 2007).
Hypotheses were proposed regarding mood and multitasking, based on global
(positive mood) vs. local (negative mood) processing of information. One hypothesis
posited that positive moods would facilitate multitasking, as an expansion of attention
would help monitor changes in all quadrants of the screen. Conversely, a second
hypothesis stated that the added task monitoring would be distracting and increase task
switch costs, whereas negative moods would facilitate successful completion of
individual tasks. A neutral mood was included to help clarify any differences between the
positive and negative moods, but given that global processing is considered to be the
default, the neutral condition was predicted to align more with the positive condition.
This expectation was in fact confirmed. People in positive and neutral moods were
superior multitaskers after the mood induction, supporting the first hypothesis. The
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equivalence between positive and neutral, then, would seem to imply a penalty to the
negative condition (rather than a benefit for positive mood). However, the interaction
between video condition and multitasking phase makes this conclusion questionable
because the neutral and negative conditions were equal at MT 2.
Overall, negative mood had a clear, immediate, detrimental impact on
multitasking performance relative to positive mood. Furthermore, although multitasking
performance increased from MT 1 to MT 2 for both positive and negative conditions,
positive mood was associated with a relatively larger effect size than negative mood.
Although this finding appears to run counter to Barth and Funke (2010), the task used by
Barth and Funke (running a simulated tailor shop) was much more complex and
analytical than SYNWORK, which would favor people in a negative mood. Importantly,
there was also only one task, as opposed to multitasking. Curiously, the neutral video
condition did not improve at all between MT 1 and MT 2. It may be that the performance
of the positive group continued to increase because of increased motivation (Isen &
Reeve, 2005). Although there were no differences in the clicking behavior among the
groups, it is possible that motivation had a small impact on task performance. If the lack
of improvement by the neutral condition between MT 1 and MT 2 is not an aberration,
then the improvement in the negative group might represent delayed task learning or
simply regression to the mean (i.e., the neutral condition) at MT 2. These questions may
be investigated in future studies.
In addition to overall multitasking scores, we also assessed performance on the
individual tasks. The results suggested that the difference in overall scores was a product
of all four tasks because there were no statistically significant differences attributable to
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any individual task, although memory and math (the two most complex tasks) were
marginally significant. These tasks are somewhat more cognitively challenging than the
Visual Monitoring or Auditory Monitoring tasks, so task complexity appears to be related
to task switch costs (Rubinstein et al., 2001). The equivalence between positive and
negative moods on the Visual Monitoring task indicated there was no impairment of
prospective memory for the negative video condition.
People in a positive mood were expected to be more distractible than their
negative counterparts. However, the number of interruptions in the math task suggested
that, if anything, people in a positive mood were less distractible. Thus, although there is
a preference for global processing of visual information in positive moods, this does not
imply a reduced ability for local processing (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005). Another
possibility is that the impact of mood on attentional focus may depend on whichever
focus (global vs. local) is currently dominant (Huntsinger, 2012). Furthermore, Dreisbach
(2006) noted that increased distractibility for positive moods may not hold true under
sufficiently complex cognitive demand.
The results from Experiment 1 raise additional questions. Mood may affect not
only multitasking performance, but multitasking adaptation as well, as these may be
different constructs (Morgan et al., 2013b). For example, how does mood impact
multitasking performance under changing task constraints (i.e., increased difficulty)?
This question was assessed in a second experiment wherein participants multitasked at
baseline difficulty, watched a mood-induction video, and resumed multitasking under
increasing difficulty.

26

Experiment 2
As mentioned previously, multitasking performance and adaptation may be
separate constructs. Morgan et al. (2013b) had participants multitask in a flight simulator
under increasing levels of difficulty. Whereas working memory and aptitude predicted
multitasking performance (i.e., performance at baseline), spatial ability was the best
predictor of adaptation (i.e., performance at increased difficulty after controlling for
baseline performance). Moreover, Morgan et al., (2013a) used a cluster analysis to
identify high, medium, and low adapters across three multitasking phases of increasing
difficulty. Those in the high adapter clusters also had higher spatial ability than those in
the medium and low adapter clusters. Thus, if multitasking performance and adaptation
are separate constructs, the impact of mood on adaptation may not mirror the results of
Experiment 1. Accordingly, Experiment 2 assessed the impact of mood on multitasking
adaptation by increasing the difficulty of the four tasks in both experimental conditions.
All other experimental methods remained identical to the previous study.
Task difficulty was increased by increasing the time constraints for each task.
Specifically, the Math and Visual Monitoring tasks had to be completed in less time, and
the frequency of the Memory and Audio Monitoring probes increased. Manipulating task
difficulty in this fashion offered a number of advantages. First, the focus remained on
multitasking (between-task) adaptation, rather than task-specific (within-task) adaptation.
Second, in keeping the rules for each individual task identical to Experiment 1, it allowed
for a more direct comparison of the results between the two experiments. Third, there is
real-world relevancy, as time constraints are common in an increasingly fast-paced
society (Rastegary & Landy, 1993).
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One prediction would be a replication of the previous results, namely (positive =
neutral) > negative. However, there may be an interaction based on the difficulty of the
task. One prediction would be that the video conditions would not decrease equally
between the emergency phases. The match between a person’s mood and thoughts (mood
congruency effects; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992) may cause people in a
negative mood may be more pessimistic, resulting in subjective differences in task
demand (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001; Zadra & Clore, 2011). Specifically, people in a
negative mood would be more likely to view the task as too difficult, resulting in a
steeper drop in performance than those in the neutral or positive conditions. There is also
evidence to suggest that people in a negative mood are less motivated to expend effort
when the task is difficult (Brinkmann & Gendolla, 2008).

Method
Participants
The sample was composed of 187 participants recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). Participants were over 18, from the USA, and paid $1.75 for
their participation.
Materials
Multitasking Environment. The multitasking environment will be the
SYNWORK program described in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1). The four SYNWORK
tasks were implemented exactly as described in Experiment 1, except for separate
difficulty levels for the Practice/Baseline, Emergency 1, and Emergency 2 conditions for
each task. For the Memory task, participants had 10 s to respond to each probe in the
Practice and Baseline conditions. For the Emergency 1 and Emergency 2 conditions,
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participants had five and three s, respectively, to respond to each probe. In the Visual
Monitoring task, the pointer moved once per second in the Practice and Baseline
conditions, but once every 0.5 s in Emergency 1 and every 0.4 s in Emergency 2. Again,
points were deducted at the same rate as the pointer’s movement, meaning points were
deducted faster for a timeout in Emergency 2 than in Emergency 1 or Baseline. For the
Auditory Monitoring task, probes occurred every 10 s in the Practice and Baseline
conditions, but every 3.5 s for Emergency 1 and every 1.4 s for Emergency 2. For the
Math task, participants had 30 s to solve each problem in the Practice and Baseline
conditions, but 18 s in Emergency 1 and 15 s in Emergency 2.
Emotional Stimuli. Positive, neutral, and negative moods were induced via one
of the three film clips described in Experiment 1.
Affect Grid. Participants self-reported their current affective state via an affect
grid as described in Experiment 1 (see Figure 2).
Procedure
Participants first read the instructions for the affect grid (see Figure 4) and rated
their emotional arousal and valence. Next, participants were trained on each of the four
tasks individually before practicing all four simultaneously (multitasking) for one minute.
No instructions were given regarding the priority of the tasks. After training, participants
completed a baseline multitasking condition (3 min). Participants were then randomly
assigned to one of three video conditions: positive (N = 42), neutral (N = 39), or negative
(N = 37). After watching the video, participants resumed multitasking for two additional
conditions (3 min each.
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Figure 4. Affect Grid Instructions

In Experiment 2, subsequent multitasking conditions increased in difficulty
(Emergency 1 and Emergency 2; E1, E2). Other than the difficulty manipulation, the
experimental method was identical to Experiment 1. Participants also rated their
emotional arousal and valence after the Baseline condition, after watching the video, and
after both subsequent multitasking conditions.
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Results
First, the efficacy of the mood induction was assessed because a notable
percentage of people fail to respond to mood induction procedures (Martin, 1990). There
were 24 participants who did not report an affect valence of 7-9 in the positive video
condition, 26 who did not report an affect valence of 4-6 in the neutral video condition,
and 16 who did not report an affect valence of 1-3 in the negative video condition. These
stringent removal criteria were used to give confidence that each participant was in the
mood intended to be elicited by the video. A Chi-Square Test of Independence indicated
that there were no group differences in attrition rate, χ2 (2, N = 183) = 1.80, p = .407.
In addition to mood congruence, multitasking competency was also assessed.
After calculating SYNWORK scores, one participant in the negative condition was not
able to adequately perform the task (overall E2 score of -7015 and was removed. There
was also an error in the SYNWORK program, where the “Reset” button for the visual
monitoring task did not increase the score throughout the entire experiment for two
participants (one neutral and one positive). Multitasking performance with z-scores ± 3
were recoded to 3 standard deviations for the remaining 118 participants.
Mood Induction
Our first analysis was to assess the efficacy of the mood elicitation. Participants
rated their mood three times: after watching the video (Post-Video), after the first
experimental multitasking phase (Post-E1), and after the second experimental
multitasking phase (Post-E2). The mood induction was assessed with two 3 × 3 (video
condition × affect grid phase) mixed ANOVAs, with valence and arousal ratings as the
dependent variables.
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Table 6 presents means and standard deviations for video condition and affect
scores. For valence, an ANOVA showed a main effect for affect grid phase, F(2, 230) =
106, p < .001, ηp2 = .479, MSe = 2.09. Planned comparisons revealed the following
pattern in the data: Post-E2 < Post-E1 < Post-Video (p < .001 for all comparisons).
Whereas in Experiment 1, the participants’ valence improved after multitasking, it
dropped sharply in Experiment 2, likely due to the difficulty of the task. There was a
main effect for video condition, F(2, 115) = 36.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .391, MSe = 4.49, with
planned comparisons confirming positive > neutral > negative (p < .006 for all
comparisons). There was also a significant interaction, F(4, 230) = 51.2, p < .001, ηp2 =
.471, MSe = 2.09. For Post-Video ratings, planned comparisons revealed the following
pattern in the data: positive > neutral > negative (p < .001 for all comparisons), which
confirms the impact of the mood induction. However, there were no differences between
video conditions at E1 (p > .490 for all comparisons). At E2, there was a pattern of
positive > negative (p = .029), but no differences for the neutral condition (p > .223).
Also, the valence scores for the positive and neutral conditions mirrored the overall
pattern (Post-E2 < Post-E1 < Post-Video, p < .006 for all comparisons). In contrast, the
following pattern was found for the negative condition: Post-Video = Post-E2 (p = .353)
< Post-E1 (p < .003 for both). Thus, after E2, the negative group had the same valence as
after watching the negative video.
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Table 6
Valence and Arousal Means (SD) by Condition and Phase
Affect Grid Phase
Valence

Post-Video
8.00 (0.733)
4.90 (0.680)
1.89 (0.737)
4.93 (0.72)

Post-E1
3.50 (2.38)
2.95 (1.79)
3.16 (2.37)
3.20 (2.18)

Post-E2
2.69 (2.17)
1.79 (1.17)
2.19 (1.93)
2.22 (1.76)

Average
4.73 (1.76)
3.21 (1.22)
2.41 (1.68)

Post-Video
Positive
7.05 (1.45)
Video
Neutral
4.38 (1.70)
Condition
Negative
5.46 (1.91)
5.63 (1.91)
Average
E1 = Emergency 1; E2 = Emergency 2

Post-E1
7.69 (1.81)
7.13 (1.96)
7.11 (1.85)
7.31 (1.88)

Post-E2
7.67 (2.14)
7.18 (2.25)
7.24 (2.35)
7.36 (2.24)

Average
7.74 (1.80)
6.23 (1.97)
6.60 (2.04)

Video
Condition

Positive
Neutral
Negative
Average

Arousal

After assessing valence, an identical analysis was conducted on arousal. There
was a main effect for affect grid phase, F(2, 230) = 46.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .289, MSe = 2.45.
Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data: Post-E2 = Post-E1 (p =
.724) > Post-Video (p < .001 for both). Although both emergency phases had higher
arousal scores than directly after the video, there was no difference between the increased
difficulty phases. There was a main effect for video condition F(2, 115) = 7.58, p = .001,
ηp2 = .116, MSe = 6.49, showing the following trend: neutral = negative (p = .272) <
positive (p < .010 for both). There was also a significant interaction, F(4, 230) = 6.33, p <
.001, ηp2 = .099, MSe = 2.45. Planned comparisons revealed a pattern of positive > neutral
> negative (p < .007 for all comparisons), but only for the Post-Video phase. As with the
first experiment, people in the positive video condition reported higher arousal
immediately after the video, but otherwise there were no arousal differences.
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Multitasking Performance and Adaptation
Overall Scores. The descriptive statistics for multitasking scores are presented in
Table 7. A one-way ANOVA with overall SYNWORK scores (i.e., the sum of the four
individual task scores) as the dependent variable showed no differences between the
video groups at Baseline (p = 0.135). To assess the impact of mood on multitasking
adaptation, it was necessary to control for previous performance. This was accomplished
with two different methods. The first method (ANCOVA) controlled for multitasking
performance by using the respective Baseline score as a covariate. The second method
(difference scores) calculated adaptation as the change in score from the previous
multitasking phase, that is, E1 – BL and E2 – E1.
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Table 7
Experiment 2 Multitasking Means (SD) by Condition and Phase
Condition
Positive
Neutral
Negative

MT BL
284 (178)
235 (209)
197 (187)

Multitasking Phase
E1
E2
-113 (610)
-1096 (700)
-96.7 (443)
-1102 (677)
-337 (658)
-1096 (700)

Memory

Positive
Neutral
Negative

76.9 (73.3)
72.8 (80.3)
49.7 (81.2)

-29.8 (154)
-55.6 (139)
-55.7 (154)

-281 (227)
-302 (192)
-379 (216)

-155 (190)
-179 (165)
-218 (185))

Visual

Positive
Neutral
Negative

66.0 (37.9)
71.4 (27.4)
76.1 (17.3)

-7.88 (278)
34.8 (160)
-70.5 (295)

-177 (374)
-138 (346)
-359 (656)

-92.4 (326)
-51.8 (253)
-215 (475)

Audio

Positive
Neutral
Negative

46.4 (31.3)
34.9 (37.3)
37.6 (30.8)

44.0 (97.6)
36.7 (89.0)
6.76 (87.9)

-181 (205)
-285 (191)
-316 (180)

-68.7 (152)
-124 (140)
-155 (134)

Math

Positive
Neutral
Negative

98.8 (41.9)
60.8 (111)
38.4 (107)

-114 (258)
-99.0 (234)
-195 (278)

-450 (463)
-385 (444)
-468 (420)

-282 (361)
-242 (339)
-331 (349)

Visual Error

Positive
Neutral
Negative

1.62 (4.00)
0.846 (2.18)
0.730 (1.56)

16.7 (25.8)
12.3 (15.6)
22.4 (27.9)

36.5 (35.6)
32.8 (33.1)
53.9 (62.5)

26.6 (30.7)
22.6 (24.3)
38.2 (45.2)

Task
Overall

E1&2 Avg.
-605 (655)
-600 (560)
-935 (843)

Positive
1.57 (2.32)
8.48 (5.63)
39.7 (11.7)
24.1 (8.7)
Audio Error Neutral
2.23 (1.97)
9.08 (4.79)
46.2 (10.8)
27.6 (7.8)
Negative
2.16 (2.28)
11.2 (5.48)
49.3 (16.1)
30.3 (10.8)
MT BL = Multitasking Baseline; E1= Emergency 1; E2 = Emergency 2; Avg. = Average

ANCOVA. The impact of mood on multitasking performance was assessed with a
3 × 2 (video condition × multitasking phase) mixed ANCOVA, with overall SYNWORK
scores as the dependent variable. The between-subjects independent variable was video
condition (positive, neutral, negative), whereas the within-subjects independent variable
was multitasking phase (E1, E2). Baseline Multitasking scores were included as a
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covariate to control for performance prior to watching the mood elicitation videos. The
results revealed a marginally significant main effect for video condition, F(2, 114) =
2.69, p = .072, ηp2 = .045, MSe = 490,000. Planned comparisons revealed the following
pattern in the data: negative < neutral, (p = .023). There were no differences between
positive and negative (p = .143) or positive and neutral (p = .393). These data are plotted
in Figure 5. Given the difference in post-video arousal scores, a separate model was
tested which included post-video arousal score as a covariate; however, it was not a
statistically significant covariate (p > .05), and it had no impact on either main effect or
on the interaction. Hence, it was removed from the final model.
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 Overall Multitasking Scores by Video Conditions (BL as
Covariate)

The results also revealed a main effect for Phase, F(1, 114) = 89.3, p < .001, ηp2 =
.439, MSe = 238,000, indicating that multitasking scores at E2 were lower than at E1, as
expected. There was no significant interaction between multitasking phase and video
condition, F(2, 114) = 1.38, p = .260, ηp2 = .024, MSe = 238,000.
Difference Scores. The second analytical method was a one-way ANOVA with
the difference of overall SYNWORK scores between phases as the dependent variable.
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The between-subjects independent variable was video condition (positive, neutral,
negative). The results revealed a significant main effect for video condition, F(2, 115) =
3.10, p = .049, ηp2 = .051, MSe = 285,000. Planned comparisons revealed a pattern
identical to the previous experiment: neutral = positive, (p = .803) > negative, (p < .043).
Again, a separate model was tested which included post-video arousal score as a
covariate. The main effect was significant, F(2, 114) = 4.21, p = .017, ηp2 = .069, MSe =
272,000. The difference between the neutral and negative condition was similar, negative
< neutral, (p = .004). However, the positive condition was no longer significantly
different from the negative condition (p = .308). Thus, arousal appeared to be a factor in
the performance of the positive condition. Hence, future difference score analyses will
also include a model which considers arousal.
Individual Tasks. After assessing multitasking adaptation with overall
multitasking scores, the next question was whether these contrasts were caused by large
differences in one or more individual tasks, or a combination of smaller differences
across all four tasks. Accordingly, the four individual SYNWORK tasks were analyzed in
the same fashion as the analyses on overall SYNWORK scores above.
ANCOVA. In the previous experiment, there were differences among the video
conditions only for the more cognitively difficult tasks (Memory and Math). However,
when adapting to increased difficulty there were no differences for either Memory (F(2,
114) = 0.736, p = .481, ηp2 = .013, MSe = 42,400) or Math (F(2, 114) = 1.06, p = .350, ηp2
= .018, MSe = 170,000). These data are plotted in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. Instead,
there was a significant main effect for Audio Monitoring, F(2, 114) = 4.46, p = .014, ηp2
= .073, MSe = 27,800. Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data:
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positive > negative (p = .004), positive > neutral (p = .081), and neutral = negative (p =
.230). There was a main effect for Phase, F(1, 114) = 104, p < .001, ηp2 = .476, MSe =
16,800, where E2 < E1. Lastly, there was also a significant interaction, F(2, 114) = 4.06,
p = .020, ηp2 = .061, MSe =16,800. Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in
the data: negative = neutral (p = .826) < positive (p < .028), but only for the E2 phase.
These data are plotted in Figure 8. For Visual Monitoring, there was also a significant
main effect, F(2, 114) = 4.05, p = .020, ηp2 = .066, MSe = 181,000. Planned comparisons
revealed the following patterns in the data: neutral = positive (p = .757) > negative (p <
.022). There was neither a main effect for phase nor a significant interaction (p < .280).
These data are plotted in Figure 9. Taken together, the differences in the two tasks
suggest a benefit for the positive group in both Monitoring tasks.
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 Memory Scores by Video Conditions (BL as Covariate)
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Figure 7. Experiment 2 Math Scores by Video Conditions (BL as Covariate)
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 Visual Monitoring Scores by Video Conditions (BL as Covariate)
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Figure 9. Experiment 2 Audio Monitoring Scores by Video Conditions (BL as Covariate)

Difference Scores. The pattern for difference scores was largely the same as with
the ANCOVA analysis. There were no differences for either Memory (F(2, 115) = 1.24, p
= .293, ηp2 = .021, MSe = 21,800) or Math (F(2, 115) = 0.597, p = .552, ηp2 = .010, MSe =
91,500). There was a significant main effect for video condition for Audio Monitoring,
F(2, 115) = 4.55, p = .013, ηp2 = .073, MSe = 18,600). Planned comparisons revealed the
following pattern in the data: negative = neutral, (p = .444) < positive, (p < .036), which
was identical to the previous analysis. However, it should be noted that when controlling
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for post-video arousal, the main effect for video condition was not statistically
significant, F(2, 114) = 1.99, p = .141, ηp2 = .034, MSe = 17,800). There was also a main
effect for Phase, F(1, 115) = 205, p < .001, ηp2 = .641, MSe = 22,400, where E2 < E1. For
Visual Monitoring, there was a main effect for Phase, F(1, 115) = 7.93, p = .006, ηp2 =
.064, MSe = 115,000, where E2 < E1. There was also a marginally significant main effect
for video condition, F(2, 115) = 2.56, p = .081, ηp2 = .043, MSe = 110,000. Planned
comparisons revealed the following patterns in the data: negative < neutral, (p = .038),
negative < positive, (p = .071), and neutral = positive, (p = .751). When controlling for
arousal, the main effect for video condition was significant, though the planned
comparisons between positive and negative were not (p = .322). As with the ANCOVA
analysis, the broad pattern implies a benefit for the positive group in both Monitoring
tasks.
Monitoring Errors. In the previous experiment, the mood differences in the
Memory and Math tasks were primarily due to errors; there were no differences for
correct responses. The next step was to determine whether this pattern was true for the
Audio and Visual Monitoring tasks. Whereas only errors of commission (i.e., incorrect
responses) were considered for Memory and Math, in the two Monitoring tasks timeouts
constituted a failed task attempt. Hence, timeouts were also considered to be errors for
this analysis.
ANCOVA. For correct responses, there were no mood differences for Audio
Monitoring (F(2, 114) = 1.44, p = .242, ηp2 = .025, MSe = 81.2) and Visual Monitoring
(F(2, 114) = .977, p = .380, ηp2 = .017, MSe = 65.0). However, there was a significant
main effect for Audio Monitoring errors, F(2, 114) = 5.72, p = .004, ηp2 = .091, MSe =
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105, with planned comparisons revealing the following pattern in the data: positive <
negative, p = .001 (see Table 7 for descriptives). That is, the negative group had more
errors than the positive group. There was a marginally significant difference where
neutral < positive (p = .085), and no difference between neutral and negative (p = .103).
There was a main effect for Phase, F(1, 114) = 475, p < .001, ηp2 = .807, MSe = 83.4,
where E1 < E2. There was also a significant interaction, F(2, 114) = 3.18, p = .045, ηp2 =
.053, MSe = 83.4. Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data at E1:
positive = neutral, (p = .949) < negative, (p < .050 for both). The following pattern was
revealed for E2: positive (p < .050) < neutral = negative, (p = .276). For Visual
Monitoring, there was a significant main effect for video condition, F(2, 114) = 3.71, p =
.027, ηp2 = .061, MSe = 1,630, with planned comparisons revealing the following pattern
in the data: neutral = positive, (p = .853) < negative, (p < .025). There was also a main
effect for Phase, F(1, 114) = 40.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .260, MSe = 767, where E1 < E2.
Overall, the analysis of Audio and Visual Monitoring errors reflects the group differences
in the respective Monitoring scores, namely a benefit to the positive group.
Difference Scores. For correct responses, there were again no mood differences
for either Audio Monitoring (F(2, 115) = 1.84, p = .164, ηp2 = .031, MSe = 47.8)) or
Visual Monitoring (F(2, 115) = 1.54, p = .218, ηp2 = .026, MSe = 45.5)). However, there
was a significant main effect for Audio Monitoring errors, F(2, 115) = 5.09, p = .008, ηp2
= .081, MSe = 81.7, and planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data:
negative = neutral, (p = .276) > positive, (p < .044). There was a main effect for Phase,
F(1, 115) = 426, p < .001, ηp2 = .787, MSe = 107, where E1 < E2. The interaction was not
significant, F(2, 115) = 1.85, p = .162, ηp2 = .031, MSe = 107. When controlling for post-
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video arousal, the main effect for video condition was only marginally significant, F(2,
114) = 2.66, p = .074, ηp2 = .045, MSe = 78.4. Planned comparisons revealed the
following pattern in the data: positive = neutral, (p = .693), neutral < negative, (p = .093),
positive < negative, (p = .039). For Visual Monitoring, the main effect for video
condition was marginally significant, F(2, 115) = 2.53, p = .084, ηp2 = .042, MSe = 995,
with planned comparisons revealing the following pattern in the data: neutral = positive,
(p = .764), positive < negative, (p = .072), neutral < negative, (p = .040). There was a
marginally significant main effect for Phase, F(1, 115) = 3.48, p = .065, ηp2 = .029, MSe
= 1,030, where E1 < E2. The interaction was not significant, F(2, 115) = 0.144, p = .866,
ηp2 = .002, MSe = 1,030. When controlling for post-video arousal, the main effect for
video condition was significant, F(2, 114) = 3.22, p = .044, ηp2 = .053, MSe = 970.
Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data: positive = neutral, (p =
.178), positive = negative, (p = .323), neutral < negative, (p = .013). On the whole, the
difference scores analyses suggest more errors on the part of the negative group,
indicating a penalty.
Number of Clicks. Additionally, differences in adaptation could be due to
engagement rather than proficiency. That is, mood may have affected quantity rather than
quality of performance. This was assessed by comparing the total number of clicks for
each video condition.
ANCOVA. The ANCOVA analysis on total clicks indicated a marginally
significant main effect for video condition, F(2, 114) = 2.36, p = .099, ηp2 = .040, MSe =
2,410. Planned comparisons revealed the following pattern in the data: positive =
negative, (p = .865), negative < neutral, (p = .056), and positive < neutral, (p = .072).
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There was a main effect for Phase, F(1, 114) = 4.98, p = .028, ηp2 = .042, MSe = 876,
where E2 < E1. Interestingly, under increased task demands, it appears that participants
actually clicked less. There was no significant interaction between multitasking phase and
video condition, F(2, 114) = 1.38, p = .026, ηp2 = .024, MSe = 876.
Difference Scores. The second analytical method showed no differences in clicks
between video conditions, F(2, 115) = 1.17, p = .313, ηp2 = .020, MSe = 1290. As with the
ANCOVA analysis, there was a main effect for Phase, F(1, 115) = 5.99, p = .016, ηp2 =
.050, MSe = 1,710, where E2 < E1. There was no significant interaction between
multitasking phase and video condition, F(2, 115) = 1.47, p = .234, ηp2 = .025, MSe =
1,710. When including post-video arousal scores as a covariate, there were no differences
for video condition, F(2, 114) = 2.13, p = .809, ηp2 = .004, MSe = 1,280, Phase, F(1, 114)
= 0.691, p = .408, ηp2 = .006, MSe = 1,720, or the interaction, F(2, 114) = 1.20, p = .305,
ηp2 = .021, MSe = 1,720. Thus, on the whole, the three video conditions were largely
similar on overall clicking behavior.
Discussion
The impact of mood on multitasking adaptation was assessed by having
participants multitask before and after watching a positive, neutral, or negative video.
Unlike Experiment 1, however, the post-video multitasking phases increased in difficulty.
The mood induction methods were once again effective, eliciting the desired valence in
the majority of participants. Unlike the previous experiment, however, the difficulty of
the task caused valences to drop for both experimental phases.
As in Experiment 1, the positive condition reported a higher level of arousal than
did the neutral and negative conditions, but only directly after watching the video.
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Although it might be expected that positive valence and arousal are orthogonal
(Lewinsohn & Mano, 1993; Mano, 1997), there is some evidence in the literature they
may be correlated (Ashby et al., 2002), in which case the observed pattern would be
expected. Nonetheless, there still may be a concern as to whether group differences were
affected by arousal. First, an increase in arousal does not necessarily improve
performance on high-level cognitive tasks (Isen et al., 1987), and excessive arousal may
actually hurt performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Second, increasing arousal for
negative moods does not negate differences with positive moods (Dreisbach, 2004).
Lastly, the neutral group consistently outperformed the negative group, despite having
identical arousal scores.
The overall findings from Experiment 2 generally replicated those from
Experiment 1, namely a penalty for negative mood (rather than a benefit for positive
mood) with the increase in difficulty. In addition to lower overall multitasking scores, the
negative group had lower scores on the two monitoring tasks. As with Experiment 1, the
group differences were attributable to more errors rather than fewer correct responses.
The results address a number of theories on mood and adaptation. First, the lack
of a mood × phase interaction for overall multitasking scores did not support either of
two theoretical predictions. The absorption hypothesis (Erber & Tesser, 1992) argues that
difficult tasks can neutralize previously induced moods, and supported by Van Dillen and
Koole (2007). Hence, the absorption hypothesis would predict the three moods to be
more equivalent at multitasking at E2 than at E1. Next, the Affect Infusion Model
(Forgas, 1995) makes the opposite claim, namely that high cognitive demand exacerbates
the effects of mood. Here, the prediction would be greater differences among the mood
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groups at E2 than E1. However, the data did not support either of these models as there
was no mood × phase interaction.
Second, the resource allocation model (Seibert & Ellis, 1991) would predict that
the complex process of emotional control would compete with cognitive resources. This
competition would then presumably affect both positive and negative moods equally
(Ellis, Seibert, & Varner, 1995). The resource allocation model was not supported by
current findings, which did not indicate any limitation from intrusive thoughts for
positive moods. This is aligned with other previous research which suggests that positive
moods may actually be adaptive for working memory tasks (Bless et al., 1996).
Third, the dual-force model (Fiedler, 2001), based on the Piagetian concepts of
assimilation and accommodation, predicts that negative moods would actually be more
adaptive than positive moods in certain contexts. Specifically, negative moods have been
shown to be superior to positive moods at updating their mental set and modifying their
strategy based on changes in task constraints (Gasper, 2003). That is, negative moods
tend to accommodate whereas heuristic-driven positive moods tend to assimilate (Fiedler,
2001). The dual-force model, then would predict that negative moods would be superior
at avoiding mistakes on stimulus-driven, reproductive tasks (Fiedler, 2001). However,
this was not the case in the current context because the negative group exhibited more
mistakes than their positive and neutral counterparts.
The poorer adaptation for the negative group may be because people in negative
moods are motivated to resolve their affective state through self-regulation (Isen, 1984).
This process can deplete self-control resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), which are
necessary for executive control processes (Schmeichel, 2007). Under these
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circumstances, performance can drop for individuals with depleted self-control resources
(Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003).
Although the results for mood and overall multitasking scores replicated those
from Experiment 1, the impact of mood on the individual tasks had a different pattern.
Whereas under consistent difficulty, mood group differences occurred in the Memory and
Math tasks, under increased difficulty, the mood differences were the Video and Audio
Monitoring tasks instead. This supports the argument that multitasking under increasing
difficulty may be a different construct than multitasking under consistent difficulty
(Morgan et al., 2013b). A previous study (Morgan et al., 2013b) reported that one set of
cognitive abilities predicted multitasking ability (working memory, general aptitude).
However, a different cognitive ability (spatial visualization) predicted multitasking
adaptability (performance under increased difficulty after controlling for multitasking
ability). This is supported by the current findings, as the Memory and Math tasks draw on
different cognitive abilities than the Monitoring tasks (Table 1).
Together, the findings from the two experiments provide novel information
regarding the impact of mood on multitasking performance and adaptation. Although the
idea that positive workers might be more effective multitaskers than negative ones is not
new (e.g., Lucas & Diener, 2003), these experiments provide causal evidence with data
collected in a simulated work environment. It is critical to understand how moods affect
multitasking because the baserate prevalence of both moods and multitasking suggests
they would overlap with some frequency. Recent findings combine to paint a grim picture
of negative affect and multitasking: not only is negative affect associated with greater
multitasking frequency (Becker, Alzahabi, & Hopwood, 2013) and duration
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(Calderwood, Ackerman, & Conklin, 2014), but these same individuals may have a
harder time regulating their emotion (Pea et al., 2012). These, combined with the current
findings, warn of a potential vicious cycle, where multitaskers are depressed, performing
worse than their counterparts (due both to negative affect and the inherent costs of
multitasking), and are unable to break the cycle because of an impairment to emotion
regulation.
Although the results supported the hypotheses that negative moods hinder
multitasking, some limitations of these studies could be addressed in future work. For
example, participants multitasked over a relatively short time span, so the medium- to
long-term impact of mood on multitasking performance and adaptation is unknown.
Second, mood may be mediated by relevant individual differences measures (e.g.,
working memory) which were not assessed in this experiment. Third, although
SYNWORK is a domain-general multitasking environment, it remains to be seen if these
findings will generalize to other multitasking environments, both domain-general and
domain-specific.
These findings have important implications for practitioners and researchers in
human affect and performance. First, mood does appear to have an impact on both
multitasking performance and adaptation, in line with numerous studies in various singletask environments. Second, it was argued on logical and methodological grounds for the
inclusion of a neutral condition as a control in any study involving multiple affective
states. These results illustrate how a neutral condition provides more information than a
simple control condition. Third, negative mood generally resulted in worse multitasking
performance and adaptation relative to positive and neutral moods in the current
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environment. However, it is important to note that this may not hold true in all situations.
For example, in some real-world scenarios, it may not be necessary to multitask.
Although negative moods are associated with more frequent multitasking (Pea et al.,
2012) and multitasking for longer durations (Calderwood et al., 2014), the direction of
causality is not known. Lastly, the results of both experiments ran counter to a number of
findings from single-task studies. In Experiment 1, there was no evidence of increased
distractibility when in a positive mood, and in Experiment 2, there was no interaction
between positive and negative moods as the difficulty of the task increased, contrary to
various theoretical predictions. Hence, current understandings of mood in single tasks
may not translate to the increasingly ubiquitous multitasking environments.
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Appendix

Appendix A.
Kurtosis Statistics (Std. Error) by Phase and Condition
Phase
BL
E1
E2

Positive
1.88 (0.717)
0.199 (0.717)
-0.384 (0.717)

Condition
Neutral
0.800 (0.741)
1.27 (0.741)
1.07 (0.741)

Memory

BL
E1
E2

-0.754 (0.717)
-0.020 (0.717)
0.836 (0.717)

-0.622 (0.741)
-0.043 (0.741)
1.62 (0.741)

-0.945 (0.759)
-0.964 (0.759)
1.30 (0.759)

Visual

BL
E1
E2

5.06 (0.717)
2.49 (0.717)
0.161 (0.717)

2.71 (0.741)
3.20 (0.741)
-0.263 (0.741)

2.30 (0.759)
2.58 (0.759)
0.668 (0.759)

Audio

BL
E1
E2

0.142 (0.717)
0.031 (0.717)
-1.26 (0.717)

0.427 (0.741)
1.28 (0.741)
0.015 (0.741)

0.810 (0.759)
0.821 (0.759)
-0.499 (0.759)

Math

BL
E1
E2

0.599 (0.717)
0.175 (0.717)
0.811 (0.717)

1.96 (0.741)
2.80 (0.741)
0.95 (0.741)

-0.377 (0.759)
-0.269 (0.759)
2.02 (0.759)

Number of Clicks

BL
E1
E2

-0.705 (0.717)
-0.293 (0.717)
0.291 (0.717)

-0.378 (0.741)
-0.313 (0.741)
-0.877 (0.741)

0.179 (0.759)
0.065 (0.759)
-0.536 (0.759)

Visual Errors

BL
E1
E2

8.11 (0.717)
2.48 (0.717)
0.184 (0.717)

5.38 (0.741)
2.93 (0.741)
-0.277 (0.741)

2.44 (0.759)
2.61 (0.759)
0.669 (0.759)

Audio Errors

BL
E1
E2

3.52 (0.717)
2.17 (0.717)
-0.369 (0.717)

1.79 (0.741)
0.292 (0.741)
-0.339 (0.741)

2.97 (0.759)
1.09 (0.759)
3.38 (0.759)

Task
Overall MT

Negative
-0.221 (0.759)
0.475 (0.759)
-0.101 (0.759)

MT = Multitasking BL = Baseline; E1= Emergency 1; E2 = Emergency 2;
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